The Reference of Theoretical Terms :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

The Reference of Theoretical TermsABSTRACT A popular explanation of the success of theories of science is that of scientific realism. It maintains, besides that the theories of a mature science atomic number 18 typically approximately true, that observational terms and theoretical terms refer to or denote entities. Therefore it is part of the living claim that reference explains success. But if the realist is not able to clarify reference and a fortiori the reference on theoretical objects, the realist comes to a vicious circle, for there is no further criterion as the success of the surmise to show that the term is referential. So it is necessary to clarify the notion reference. Needless to say, reference is a analogyal term but it easily becomes a problem that we are not precisely habituated to imagine the elation but we are convinced that a relation is just a relation in the midst of entities in a strict (viz., Quinian) sense. There are different kinds of references. For exa mple, one is usually called intentionality. If we, considering the traditional separation between reference and meaning, analyze meaning, we will find at least one referential component (intentional object). Such a referential process is not a meaningless aspect of linguistic reference, but now and then is the subject of the kind of relation called denotation. The notion of meaning and the concept of reference are nonsubstantial constructions of interpretation. Nevertheless, I argue for a reference-theoretical approach. A popular explanation for the success of scientific theories is made by presupposing scientific realism. The realists thesis maintains that typically the theories of mature science are approximately true and that observational terms and theoretical terms do actually refer, i.e. they denote entities.Therefore, it is part and parcel of the realistic claim that it is reference which explains theory success. But if we or the realist are not able to clarify what reference is and a fortiori cannot specify the reference to theoretical objects, we, and especially the realist, become composite in a vicious circle, without any further independent criterion apart from the success of the theory which shows that the term is indeed a referring term.It is therefore clear necessary to clarify the notion of reference.Needless to say, reference is a relational term but immediately a problem arises here namely, that we not only habitually imagine the relata, but we are also convinced that a relation can only be a relation between entities in a strict (Quinean) sense.